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Abstract 
We present novel estimates of Social Security Wealth (SSW) at the individual level based 
on the SHARE survey. Our estimates are based on a rigorous methodology taking into 
account country-specific legislations, the earnings history and the longevity prospects of 
individuals. The key advantage over existing estimates is that our measures of SSW is 
fully comparable across countries. This allows us to construct several indexes of the 
redistribution enacted by the pension systems in Europe. Moreover, simple correlations 
between SSW and alternative measures of private wealth are presented to provide 
descriptive evidence of the displacement effect of SSW on private wealth. 
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 This paper uses data from SHARE Wave 4 (DOI:10.6103/SHARE.w4.600), as well as from the SHARE 
Job Episodes Panel (DOI 10.6103/SHARE.jep.600). See Börsch-Supan et al. (2013) for methodological 
details.   The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through FP5 
(QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6 (SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, 
SHARELIFE: CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: N°211909, SHARE-LEAP: N°227822, 
SHARE M4: N°261982). Additional funding from the German Ministry of Education and Research, the 
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authors would also like to thank James Banks, Rob Alessie and the participants to the 2016 VIU Summer 
Institute on Ageing, Venice International University, Venice. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In most European countries social security is the prevailing form of insurance and 
assistance to protect the well-being of individuals at older ages2.  However, the increasing 
pressure to meet financial sustainability goals has hampered the action of many 
governments in reaching the desired level of coverage for retirees. The degree of old-age 
protection guaranteed by the social security system depends on a number of determinants: 
the institutional set-up and the rules in place, mortality prospects, labour force 
participation and indexation rules. The interaction of these forces may lead to different 
patterns of old-age protection outcomes, which make it imperative to have access to a 
rich dataset where all these features can be measured and compared across countries in 
order to carry out meaningful comparisons. Old-age pension rules are often quite 
complex and could vary considerably over time and across countries, for instance in 
terms of eligibility rules or benefit computation rules. Hence, it is important to rely on a 
synthetic and flexible measure of the pension provisions that is able to capture all these 
different characteristics in a parsimonious way.   
Redistribution aspects of pension systems are particularly relevant as the well-being of a 
large number of individuals may largely depend on public provisions during the 
retirement years. Yet, while there exists a vast literature on redistribution policies 
implemented through general taxation, much less has been done on the role of social 
security as a means of transferring resources, either intentionally or unintentionally. In 
                                                          
2
 In this paper we use the terms “social security” and “public pensions” as synonymous. The difference 
between social security and pensions is relevant in those countries where private occupational pensions 
play a role, such as the Netherlands. However, since we focus our attention on the first pillar only, we can 
adopt this simplification. For those cases where we want to mark the distinction we speak of “private 
pensions” or “occupational pensions”.  
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recent years financial instability of “pay-as-you-go” first pillar funds led to significant 
reductions in the generosity of pension systems in Europe, furthermore many Countries 
replaced Defined Benefit schemes with Defined Contribution schemes (also within the 
first pillar). These changes may have enhanced differences due to the former 
occupational status and job-seniority of retirees, potentially boosting inequalities. 
In this paper we document the redistributive features of the public (first pillar) pension 
systems in several European countries by making use of a summary measure of Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) computed at the individual level. Our measure, developed in 
Belloni et al. (2016), is based on the definition used in Feldstein (1974), Stock and Wise 
(1990), and more recently in the volumes edited by Gruber and Wise (1998, 2004, 2007).  
We make use of the SHARE data (Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe), a 
longitudinal dataset based on a representative sample of individuals aged 50 or over 
living in Europe. The SHARE questionnaire collects extensive information on a variety 
of aspects relevant to describe individual well-being, ranging from health conditions to 
economic resources. We will use the SSW measure presented by Belloni et al. (2016) and 
included in the fourth wave of SHARE, which has been obtained by combining 
individual-level information included in the third and the fourth waves of the survey. 
Whereas the fourth wave focuses on the situation of respondents at the time of the 
interview, the third wave (SHARELIFE) collects retrospective information on the main 
events occurring during their lives, including their work-histories. 
While several studies have looked at the importance of Social Security for various 
dimensions of well-being at country level (see for example the different country-chapters 
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of Gruber and Wise, 2004), very few authors have looked at a comprehensive study of 
the redistributive features of public pensions across Europe based on micro-data.  Indeed, 
the possibility to carry out a pan-European study of individual-level social security 
wealth and the redistribution effects of pension policies has been limited by the lack of 
appropriate and fully comparable data3. One exception in this vast literature is 
represented by  the periodical report by the OECD “Pensions at a Glance” (OECD, 2009, 
2011 and 2013) as it provides an international comparative analysis of the features of 
pension systems, including benefit calculation rules and distributional effects, based on a 
synthetic “steady-state” population. In particular, the OECD Report also presents a 
“progressivity index”, developed by Biggs et al. (2009) and based on inequality measures 
of SSW and earnings in order to assess the redistribution properties of Social Security 
Systems.  
In this paper we calculate a progressivity index based on SHARE data along the lines of 
the OECD Report, thus producing aggregate measures of the pension system generosity 
for several European countries. However, the availability of high-quality  micro-level  
data recorded in SHARE allows us to analyse the generosity of the different pension 
systems in a detailed way, for example in relation to the entire earnings distribution of 
individuals. The advantage is that we can investigate the actual determinants of the 
observed  progressivity index obtained at the aggregate level and to assess whether and 
how the different pension systems protect the welfare of low earners. Finally, we look – 
in a descriptive way – at the possible displacement effects of social security on private 
                                                          
3
 Important examples in close domains are Blau et al. (2006), Brandolini and Smeeding (2016) and Nolan 
et al. (2016). 
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wealth by plotting the share of social security wealth over a comprehensive measure of 
wealth that aggregates total private wealth and social security wealth. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the definition of our relevant 
measure of SSW and present the SHARE data, explaining how the information available 
at the individual level in SHARE can be used to generate SSW. Section 3 discusses the 
properties of the social security wealth estimates by making use of simple descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 first analyses the redistribution properties of the different pension 
systems at the country-level and then exploits the SHARE micro-data to study the degree 
of generosity of SSW along the lifetime labour income distribution of individuals. 
Section 5 investigates how SSW correlates with private household wealth and hints to a 
possible “substitutability” mechanism between these two forms of wealth. Section 6 
provides some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Estimating Social Security Wealth in the SHARE sample  
This paper is based on a summary measure of the generosity of the social security system 
known as social security wealth (SSW) that has been widely used to deal with several 
research questions in pension economics, such as retirement behavior (see, e.g. Stock and 
Wise 1990), the crowding out of private savings (Gale, 1998; Attanasio and Brugiavini, 
2003; Kapteyn et al., 2005, Alessie et al 2013), and as a general measure of the implicit 
liabilities of a government vis-à-vis its current and future retirees (Holzmann et al., 
2004).  
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Although the original concept of SSW dates back to the seminal paper of Feldstein 
(1974) and is quite general, more recent contributions offer operational definitions that 
may vary substantially, especially if applied at the individual or household level.  In this 
paper we exploit the measure of individual SSW developed in Belloni et al. (2016) based 
on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) data. Belloni et al. 
(2016) provide the first attempt at delivering a set of internationally comparable measures 
of SSW computed at the individual level for a large number of countries. The SSW 
measure includes first pillar pension benefits plus minimum pension benefits (guaranteed 
flat benefits) when relevant, it does not include survivor benefits, it is based on pension 
benefits net of income4 and payroll taxes, and it is measured in 2010 Euros5. 
Two specifications of SSW are typically adopted in the literature, depending on the 
individual’s labor market status at the time of the interview. We stick to this literature and 
define the SSW of retired respondents (retired from the labor market) as follows: 
 = ∑ ,
	

 (|)(1 + )

       (1) 
where i is the individual, a is her/his age at the time of the interview, Ω is the maximum 
attainable age, (. ) are conditional survival probabilities according to current life tables 
and r is a financial discount rate. P is the self-reported public old age pension benefit 
annualized and net of pension income taxation. In this paper conditional survival 
                                                          
4
 SHARE release 6.0.0 Wave 4 provides two SSW variables: SSW_gw and SSW_nw. They differ for 
individuals at work at the time of the interview. For the SSW_gw variable the computation of pension 
benefits is based on generated grossed-up wages. In this paper we use SSW_gw and refer to it as SSW. 
5
 All monetary in this paper values have been adjusted to take into account differences in the cost of living 
across countries by using purchasing power parity 2010 indexes. As a result, monetary values are expressed 
in 2010 “German” euros, i.e. the unit of measure is the quantity of goods that it was possible to buy in 
Germany with 1 € in 2010. 
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probabilities π are taken from the Human Mortality Database6 and are Country and 
gender-specific. The maximum attainable age is set to 109. The discount rate r is set to 2 
percent as in OECD (2013).  
The SSW of individuals who are still working at the time of the interview is defined as 
follows: 
 = ∑ ,()
	

 (|)(1 + )

      (2) 
where () is the computed public old age pension benefit assuming that the individual 
will retire from the labor market at current age a, and she will start receiving pension 
income from the old age retirement age R. The variable () is annualized and net of 
pension income taxation.  Old age retirement R is an institutional “contextual” variable 
that depends on country specific pension legislation, while maximum attainable age, 
survival probabilities and the discount rate are defined as in the case of the retirees 
presented above7.  
The SSW for workers is defined only if, at the time of the interview, minimum eligibility 
conditions for insurance or/and contribution years are met, but the worker is not yet age 
eligible for collecting a pension. In other words, we assume that the individual will retire 
at her current age, stop paying contributions to the pension system and receive a pension 
at a future age starting from the old age retirement age R. This allows us to interpret our 
measure as “accrued” SSW, as we do not make any projections of future labour supply 
and of future wages of workers in the sample but simply compute the pension rights 
                                                          
6
 www.mortality.org  
7For some countries the old age retirement age R is included, as contextual variable, in the second release of 
the SHARE Job Episode Panel, as documented in Antonova et al., 2014. 
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based on the past and current contributions. If minimum eligibility conditions in terms of 
contributory years are not met at the time of the interview, the worker is simply dropped 
from the sample. While this approach is coherent with the definition of accrued pension 
wealth, it neglects relevant cases of workers who do not meet the minimum age 
requirements past age 50, typically workers characterized by discontinuous working 
careers: a pattern which is prevalent for women. 
Data are taken from the SHARE survey, a multidisciplinary, cross-national longitudinal 
database of micro data on health, socio-economic status and social and family networks. 
The SHARE sample is representative of the populations of individuals aged 50 or over 
living in 20 European countries (plus Israel)8 and their spouses. Six waves of SHARE are 
currently available. The first two and the last three waves focus on the condition of 
respondents at the time of the interview. The third wave (SHARELIFE) is a retrospective 
survey that uses life-history interviews to gather information about the main events 
occurred throughout respondents’ lives with respect to family relationships, employment, 
health-status, health care and housing9. Our sample consists of individuals who are 
interviewed in both the Wave 4 of SHARE, which has been mainly collected in 2011, and 
in SHARELIFE, which has been collected between 2008 and 2009. 
                                                          
8
 See Börsch-Supan et al. (2013a and 2013b) and Malter and Börsch-Supan (2013) for more information on 
the SHARE data. 
9
 See Börsch-Supan et al. (2011) and Schröder (2011) for more information on the contents and the 
methodology of the life-history interviews conducted in the SHARELIFE surveys. 
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The distinction between workers and retirees is based on a question present in the fourth 
wave of SHARE, asking about the current job situation10. Information on pension benefit, 
necessary to compute SSW as in equations (1) and (2), is obtained in different ways for 
retirees and for workers, respectively. In the former case the pension benefit is observed 
in the data and can be readily inserted into the definition of SSW. In particular, the 
relevant question asks about a typical - after taxes - payment of public old age pension in 
the previous year. The amount is an ordinary typical-regular payment, excluding any 
extras, such as bonuses, 13th month etc.  For workers, the (expected) pension amount 
they will receive at retirement needs to be computed. This is a complex task since 
pension benefit computation rules are country specific. Belloni et al. (2016) rely on 
Mutual Information System on Social Protection tables (MISSOC, version July 2010) to 
define the appropriate pension rules for each country, plus information obtained directly 
from country specific publications. This calculation often requires the reconstruction of 
the individual working life as well as of the contribution rates and pension rules that were 
in place in the past. Retrospective individual data like wage history, insurance and 
contribution years and/or residential information needed to compute the pension benefit 
have been mainly obtained from the Job Episodes Panel (JEP). The JEP is a dataset based 
on SHARELIFE and it runs until 2008. It is a retrospective panel dataset in which 
respondents contribute  as  many  observations  as  their years  of  age  at  the  moment  of  
the SHARELIFE interview. This panel stores  information about the lifetime evolution  
of  respondents’ working  conditions,  ranging  from labor  market  status  to  wages  and  
                                                          
10
 The question allows for six possible, mutually exclusive, answers: 1. Retired, 2. Employed or self-
employed (including working for family business) 3. Unemployed, 4. Permanently sick or disabled, 5. 
Homemaker, 97. Other (Rentier, Living off own property, Student, Doing voluntary work). 
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job-specific characteristics.11 Although the JEP runs until 2008, our SSW measure for 
workers is based on their entire working history up to 2010 in order to exploit the 
information collected in the wave 4 of SHARE12. Consistently, the pension rules 
considered to compute the public old age pension benefits are those in place in 2010. 
Wages and relevant information for years 2009 and 2010 needed to compute the SSW 
measure are recovered from SHARE Wave 4.  
Our analysis is based on individuals living in the following twelve European countries: 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, 
Spain, Italy, Poland and Czech Republic. Estonia, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia did 
not take part to the third wave of SHARE (SHARELIFE), and therefore SSW can be 
computed only for retirees and not for workers. As a consequence, those countries are 
excluded from the investigation. We also excluded SHARE respondents residing in any 
of the twelve chosen countries who did not participate to the retrospective wave 
SHARELIFE or respondents displaying missing values in any of the relevant variables13. 
Finally, we excluded individuals aged 75 and above in 2010.  This is because older 
pensioners in our sample may have retired at very different ages and may have 
experienced several pension regimes, hence the comparisons of the aggregate SSW may 
be largely affected by sample composition as well as differences in mortality. The final 
sample contains 2,603 workers and 5,124 retirees. 
                                                          
11
 See Brugiavini et al. (2013) for more details. 
12
 In SHARE Wave 4 the income amounts collected refer to the year previous the interview.  
 
13
 To limit the presence of outliers in the monetary variables used throughout the paper we drop the 
observations reporting amounts lower than the first percentile and higher than the ninety-ninth percentile. 
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The analysis is carried out separately by gender and working status (distinguishing 
between workers and retirees). As for the former, the historical differences in labour 
market participation and in earnings-profiles between males and females as well as 
gender differences in pension rules,  provide a strong argument in favour of carrying out 
separate analyses, The latter distinction between workers and retirees is due to the fact 
that, as described earlier, the definition of SSW is different for the two groups: for 
retirees we rely on self-reported pension benefits collected in the fourth wave of SHARE, 
while for workers we compute pensions on the basis of individuals’ working career 
information collected in SHARELIFE and applying 2010 country-specific pension 
system rules. 
 
3. Social Security Wealth in Europe: descriptive statistics   
SHARE is the ideal dataset to study the redistributive features of social security systems 
across Europe since it is based on exactly the same set of questions and the same wording 
in all countries. Table 1 reports the number of individuals by country, gender and labor 
market status at the time of the interview (workers vs. retirees) included in our final 
sample. The number of retirees is much higher than the number of workers due to the 
reference population of the SHARE sample, consisting of individuals aged 50 or over and 
their spouses.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 2 reports the sample size by cohort, gender and labor market status at the time of 
the interview. As pointed out earlier, we selected individuals born between 1935 and 
12 
 
1960 (i.e. respondents aged 50 to 75 in 2010). The reason why we perform a sample 
selection based on age is twofold: on the one hand, we want to reduce the excessive 
heterogeneity in pension outcomes of different generations due to the different regimes 
experienced by the retirees, on the other hand we want to limit the effect of selectivity 
bias and attrition due to mortality. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of our SSW measure by age and labour market status. As 
expected the distribution is left-skewed, females show a slightly higher prevalence of 
lower values and a more concentrated distribution with two distinct spikes. A clear 
difference emerges between the distribution of SSW for workers and the distribution for 
retirees: a result which is in line with the definition of accrued SSW and with the fact that 
we observe more retirees than workers.  The dispersion of the SSW values can be due to 
a variety of factors, such as heterogeneity in earnings as well as in the length of the 
working careers. Moreover, the eligibility and benefit computation rules relevant for the 
retirees in our sample have changed over time. 
FIGURE 2a HERE 
FIGURE 2b HERE 
Figures 2a-2d show the box plots of SSW in the four samples of interest by country: male 
workers (2a), female workers (2b), male retirees (2c) and female retirees (2d). As 
reported above, all monetary amounts considered in the paper have been PPP-adjusted so 
that they are fully comparable across countries. Stark differences in the level of SSW 
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emerge across countries: Figure 2a shows that Poland has the lowest median SSW for 
male workers, around 35,000€, which is due to both low median annual pension benefits 
(about 3,700€) and low life expectancy (male life expectancy at the age of eligibility 65  
is 14.69 years). Comparable median values of SSW (around 100,000€) are observed in 
Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Italy and Czech 
Republic, while Sweden and Austria are characterized by somewhat higher median 
values (around 150,000€). In terms of variability in SSW, Figure 2a highlights a clear 
dichotomy. Poland, Denmark, The Netherlands and Switzerland display a very small 
interquartile range, while the SSW variation looks much higher in the remaining 
countries. As documented by Figure 2b, this ranking and clustering of countries is overall 
similar for female workers with a few noticeable exceptions, such as Germany, where the 
level and the variability in SSW for women is lower than what is observed for men and 
France, where a higher concentration prevails for female workers.  
FIGURE 2c HERE 
FIGURE 2d HERE 
It is harder to identify a pattern across countries according to the median level of SSW in 
the case of retirees. This result is likely due to the fact that more cohorts are included in 
the sample of retirees than in the sample of workers, which mechanically generates 
heterogeneity for unconditional summary measures. In fact, different cohorts have 
experienced different business-cycle conditions during their working history and have 
been exposed to different pension eligibility and benefit computation rules in place at the 
time of retirement. These issues suggest caution in the interpretation of results based on 
median values, however some meaningful comparisons can be proposed.  Looking at the 
14 
 
median SSW of retirees in Figure 2c and 2d we observe that Germany, Belgium, France 
and Switzerland median SSW for retirees is  noticeably higher than in the case of 
workers, suggesting that these countries enacted significant pension reforms aimed at 
curtailing public spending.  
It should be noted that our measure of SSW is based on old-age public (first pillar) 
pension. Although in some cases the role of occupational pensions may be relevant, in 
this paper we want to describe the provisions that individuals are entitled to in terms of 
first-pillar social security as this is normally under the direct control of the State and 
therefore is the natural policy instrument to redistribute resources 14. Table 3 reports the 
proportion of individuals receiving an old age first pillar pension who also receive an 
occupational-pension benefit. Second-pillar provisions are prevalent in Sweden, The 
Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland; results from SHARE on these percentages are in 
line with what reported by other sources, such as OECD (2016), hence suggesting that the 
public provisions are the most relevant pension income, at least in terms of coverage, and 
are correctly measured in SHARE.  
 
4. Inequality and progressivity of social security  
One objective of our study is to highlight how differences in SSW across countries may 
reflect differences in the generosity of the social security systems (including minimum 
pensions), as well as differences in lifetime earning profiles. The interplay between these 
                                                          
14
 The OECD “Pensions at a Glance” pension models include all mandatory pensions schemes for private-
sector workers, regardless of whether public (i.e. they involve payments from government or from social 
security institutions, as defined in the System of National Accounts) or private. 
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features is embedded in the pension formula: for instance, in the Netherlands, the first 
pillar benefit (AOW) depends mostly on residential life histories and does not depend on 
earning life histories (Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999). At the other extreme, the German 
social security provisions (“earnings points system”, Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2006) are 
fully based on lifetime relative earnings. In this section we will use SHARE  data to 
assess to what extent the cross-country differences in SSW dispersion previously 
documented are a result of cross-country differences in the volatility of lifetime earnings 
or they reflect different architectures of the pension system in each country. 
Disentangling these two sources of heterogeneity is essential to understand the 
contribution of the pension systems in shaping within-country SSW inequality. 
Besides presenting descriptive evidence on social security wealth, which is interesting 
per se, we want to measure in a simple way the degree of redistribution present in Europe 
which can be explained by the social security system carrying out comparisons across 
countries and within each country. In order to provide this type of evidence for pension 
provisions we make use of well-known measures such as the Gini coefficient (G-index), 
computed at the country-gender-occupation level and based on individual estimates of 
social security wealth. However, the observed inequality in SSW among countries and 
groups as measured by the G-index can be due both to heterogeneity in the institutional 
characteristics of social security systems and to differences in the lifetime earnings 
distribution, hence we also consider a measure of lifetime resources such as the average 
lifetime income (ALTI). This measure should provide a full life-course perspective of 
inequality and control for individual resources by distinguishing the lifetime-rich from 
the lifetime-poor individuals. Following Biggs et al. (2009) and the OECD (2009, 2011, 
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2013), we also consider a progressivity index, which is designed to capture the 
redistribution within the system from low-earners to high-earners.  
 
4.1 Country-level measures of inequality  
In order to provide cross-countries evidence on inequalities in pension provisions we 
make use of the G-index based on our estimates of SSW at the individual level, computed 
separately by country, gender and occupational status. Our approach is similar to the 
exercise carried out by the OECD (2009, 2011, 2013). However, some relevant 
differences should be mentioned. We focus our analysis on an estimate of SSW computed 
at the individual level for an actual sample of individuals obtained from micro data: the 
selected individuals are SHARE-respondents at a given point in time, hence 
encompassing a large set of cohorts – part of which are still at work and part are already 
retired at the time of the interview- rather than making reference to a steady-state 
“virtual” population. We make use of country-specific and gender-specific life 
expectancy rather than a population-wide life expectancy. Another important difference 
is that while we consider separately workers and retirees and measure actual accrued 
SSW (as detailed below), the OECD computes total SSW for a continuous career in the 
work-place (baseline scenario) referring to a “representative” individual of the population 
in one specific country. Finally, it should be stressed that our estimate of SSW for 
workers is a lower bound because it is the accrued SSW to date, so that it does not 
account for the entire wage growth over the life cycle. The same argument holds for 
retirees as, in agreement with the accrued-SSW definition, we do not take into account 
past benefits but only future expected benefits.  
17 
 
We exploit information from the third wave of SHARE (SHARELIFE), which reports 
retrospective wages along the working history to compute Individual Average Life-Time 
Income (ALTI). This is defined as the total capitalized sum of annualized earnings 
received over the whole working history, divided by the number of years individuals have 
worked, expressed in 2010 euros15. We argue that ALTI is a meaningful indicator to 
summarize individual’s position in the earnings distribution as it standardizes earnings 
with respect to the entire working history and it neutralizes the effect of the length of the 
career of individuals.  
FIGURE 3 HERE 
Figure 3 reports the distribution of the ALTI by gender and employment status. As in the 
case of SSW, the distribution in all subsamples is skewed with a rather long right tail.   
TABLE 4 HERE 
Results on the measures of inequality are reported in Table 4, where we present the G-
coefficient for SSW and the progressivity index. The latter is designed to summarize in a 
single value the extent of the redistribution properties embedded in the social security 
system rules. It provides a natural ranking of pension systems in terms of redistributive 
properties: when social security redistributes resources from higher- to lower-earning 
groups it is regarded as progressive. Two are the key ingredients needed to calculate a 
progressivity index: an inequality index for SSW and an inequality index for an 
appropriately defined measure of lifetime earnings (ALTI). The progressivity index is 
                                                          
15
 Because of the nature of the data, we have to assume that wages are constant in real terms within each 
past job spell, which delivers a lower bound measure of lifetime income at the individual level, as part of 
the within-spell growth is neglected. 
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defined as the difference between 1 and the ratio between the G-index for SSW and the 
G-index for ALTI, normalized to 100. The lower the inequality in SSW compared to the 
inequality in average lifetime income, the higher is the progressivity of the pension 
system and the higher the progressivity index. It varies from 100 in pure flat schemes 
(maximum redistribution) to negative for regressive pension systems.  
In order to correctly interpret the progressivity index, one has to take into account that the 
same pension system can be found to be more progressive/regressive in our data 
depending on the underlying income distribution to which pension rules are applied. 
Therefore, a meaningful comparison of the index across countries can be performed for 
countries with similar values of the  G-index for ALTI, which is why we also report the 
G-index performed on ALTI as well. 
Table 4 shows that the G-index of SSW (first columns) is characterized by a marked 
cross country variability: a striking difference emerges for German male workers vis-a-
vis Danish or Swiss workers, the gap is even wider for women. If we turn the attention to 
retirees, we find that in many countries inequality is higher than among workers and that 
it is highest in Belgium and lowest in the Netherlands. Cross-country heterogeneity in 
average lifetime income inequality is also substantial. For instance, the G-index for ALTI 
for Polish retirees is respectively two and three times higher than the values found for 
their Swedish and German counterparts. These simple cross-country comparisons can 
provide some insight of the role played by the pension system architecture in shaping the 
SSW inequality. Consider the case of male workers in Austria and Denmark: the G-index 
in ALTI is the same but the SSW inequality in Austria is much higher, (three times 
higher) than the one found in Denmark. As a result the progressivity index for male 
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workers is equal to 78.26 and 21.74 respectively. Conditioning on the same level of 
inequality in ALTI, the Danish pension system appears to be more redistributive than the 
one in place in Austria. Germany and Belgium present similar levels of inequality in 
ALTI of male workers, but their progressivity indexes show wide variation: -57.69 for 
Germany, 42.86 for Belgium. Keeping earnings inequality constant, the Belgian pension 
system is more redistributive than the German one16. 
 
4.2 Within-country measures of inequality  
The analysis based on the progressivity index provides an overall country-level measure 
of redistribution (separately by gender and employment status) determined by the pension 
system. However, it is limited in scope as it does not provide information on which part 
of the earnings distribution is more affected by the public pension redistributive rules and 
it cannot be used to assess the extent to which  the pension system of a given country 
protects individuals who are “lifetime poor” vis-à-vis those who are “lifetime rich”.   
In order to provide a more accurate representation of inequality and to disentangle the 
“pension rules” effect from the “lifetime-earnings distribution” effect at the individual 
level, we propose a new simple index of Relative Social Security Wealth (RSSW) given 
                                                          
16
 We computed the relevant indexes also making use of LTI (Lifetime Income), i.e. the capitalized sum of 
earnings, which is just the numerator of ALTI. The LTI would greatly enhance differences in career length 
rather than actual earnings, on the other hand ALTI may generate a similar number for a low-wage worker 
who worked many years and a high-earner who worked a few years. Figure A.1 reports the distribution of 
LTI, which is more dispersed than ALTI due to the fact that it encompasses variability in earnings and 
length of working career. As for the inequality measures the country ranking is preserved and our results 
are confirmed (Table A.1 in the Appendix).  
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by the ratio between Social Security Wealth (SSW) and Average LifeTime Income 
(ALTI): 
     RSSW= SSW/ALTI 
Although the spirit is similar to the concept behind the progressivity index, we stress that 
in our analysis both measures are computed at the individual level, so that we obtain a 
measure of RSSW for each individual in the sample. 
We argue that RSSW can be informative of the redistributive features of the pension 
systems since it shows to what extent the SSW of an individual compares to the average 
labor income she earned during her whole working career, which is positively related to 
the average amount of yearly contributions paid to the social security administration. The 
higher is the SSW of a worker relatively to her average lifetime income, the higher is the 
generosity of the pension system for this worker.  The standardization of SSW with 
respect to ALTI, both taken at the individual level, allows for a meaningful comparison 
of the “pension generosity” between groups and countries. However, one aspect of 
caution is the effect of birth-cohort and age on SSW and ALTI, which then may affect 
both the numerator and denominator of RSSW.  Our sample involves individuals from 
different birth-cohorts who might have been exposed to different pension regimes, which 
were often phased in according to age or year-of-birth of workers either by explicit 
design or simply because of the timing of maturity or vesting of benefits. Furthermore, 
individuals from different birth-cohorts might have faced different phases of the business 
cycle in different stages of their working careers producing cohort-differentials in their 
earnings age profiles. Any meaningful analysis of the determinants of RSSW should 
control for cohort/age effects. 
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We can assess the redistributive properties of pension systems along the average lifetime 
income distribution of individuals. Our exercise documents how the generosity of the 
pension rules varies with individual average lifetime earnings and is successful in 
granting higher level of protection to workers who are “lifetime poor”, i.e. workers whose 
ALTI appears in the left tail of the distribution. To do this, we predict the median ratio 
RSSW at each average lifetime income quintile by performing a set of country-specific 
median regressions for the four samples of interest. Since we are dealing with cross-
sectional data it is not possible to disentangle birth-cohort from age effects. However, we 
allow for RSSW to vary among cohorts/ages by including in the regressions a set of 
cohort dummies as shown in Table 2.  
TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 5 reports the fitted median of the RSSW ratio for workers, by country of residence, 
quintile of average lifetime income (from Q1, lower quintile to Q5, higher quintile) and 
gender.  
FIGURE 4 HERE 
Figure 4 presents the same results in graphical terms focusing on Germany: quintiles of 
lifetime income ALTI are on the X-axis and the ratio RSSW is on the Y-axis. Germany is 
characterised by a very limited pension income redistribution as the fitted RSSW ratio 
remains constant throughout the whole lifetime income range. This finding shows that, 
conditional on birth-cohort, the SSW of German workers varies proportionally with their 
average lifetime income so that the same inequality observed in lifetime earnings is to a 
large extent reflected in pensions.  
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FIGURE 5 HERE 
A different picture emerges for Spain and Italy (Figure 5) as there exists a clear gradient. 
The RSSW of Spanish male workers exhibits a huge drop between the first and the 
second quintile (50 percentage points) followed by a modest reduction at the higher 
quintiles. A similar pattern is found for women. These findings suggest that the Spanish 
pension system operates a significant redistribution in favour of lower lifetime-earnings 
individuals. The ratio between SSW and ALTI of Spanish workers in the left tail is  
higher than in the right tail. Similar results are found for Italian women:  the ratio of SSW 
to average lifetime earnings of female workers decreases by 48 percentage points 
between the first and second quintile of the earnings distribution and it remains overall 
flat afterwards. This pattern is less marked for Italian men. 
FIGURE 6 HERE 
Figure 6 shows that a third welfare model emerges for Denmark and the Netherlands. In 
these countries, the profile of the median RSSW index appears to be steadily decreasing 
over the whole earnings distribution. Focusing on the Danish male workers, we notice 
that the ratio constantly decreases by 20 percentage points at each quintile.  
TABLE 6 HERE 
Table 6 summarizes the results for retirees: we can cluster countries into two groups. A 
first group including Germany, Belgium, Switzerland and the Czech Republic, in which 
the SSW/ALTI ratio displays a moderate  decline between the first and second quintile 
and a second group where RSSW declines significantly between the first two quintiles.  
FIGURE 7 HERE 
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Our estimates capture in an effective way how pension rules have affected different birth-
cohorts of workers and retirees: Germany is an interesting case in this respect. The profile 
of the RSSW index for German workers - as shown in Figure 3 - is basically flat, in line 
with the rules used to compute pension benefits according to the current German pension 
system, which sets the benefit amount equal to the product between the ratio of 
individuals’ earnings on the average national earnings times a coefficient proportional to 
the length of contributing history. Figure 7 reports that the ratio for retirees is steadily 
decreasing over earning quintile values. Figure 7 confirms German retirees are entitled to 
levels of pensions (and SSW) that accrued according to the pre-reform rules: the 
declining ratio suggests the presence of redistribution mechanisms in favor of current 
retirees experiencing lower earnings during their working history. 
 
5. Social Security Wealth, Financial Wealth and Real Wealth 
In the previous sections we focused the attention on inequalities in a SSW measure based 
on first-pillar pensions. However, this is a partial view of the resources available to 
individuals and households, as it neglects private wealth holdings. In this section, we 
attempt an estimate of the correlation between SSW with other forms of private 
household wealth. Forward-looking agents who expect lower levels of SSW might have 
stronger incentives to save and cumulate private wealth in order to guarantee adequate 
standards of living during their retirement years (see, e.g., Alessie, Angelini, Van Santen, 
2013; Attanasio and  Brugiavini, 2003). This is a relevant point for policy makers since 
the design of Social Security Systems may result in a variety of household economic 
choices related to financial and real wealth investments, including participation to 
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financial markets and home-ownership. Households endowed with higher levels of SSW 
might be less prone to participate in financial markets or to save in order to buy a house 
because they know that the wealth accrued in the Social Security System will be an 
effective safety net protecting their standard of living at older ages. Some authors have 
discussed of an actual “displacement effect” of SSW on private wealth holdings or on the 
saving rate (Feldstein, 1974; Dicks-Mireaux and King, 1984; Attanasio and Brugiavini, 
2003; Blau, 2006).  Whether SSW actually produces a displacement effect on financial 
and real wealth is an empirical issue that requires a comprehensive theoretical framework 
explicitly designed to model lifetime accumulation of private wealth, insurance contracts 
and old-age protection instruments. Such a complex model is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but even in this simplified framework we can exploit the detailed information 
provided by the Wave 4 of SHARE about household financial and real wealth to provide 
descriptive evidence about the relationship between SSW and private wealth of older 
European individuals. 
SHARE data contain household measures of net financial and real wealth. Net financial 
wealth is defined as the sum of money held by households in bank accounts, stocks, 
bonds, mutual funds and savings for long-term investments, net of financial liabilities. 
Net real wealth is the value of the main residence, of other real estates and of businesses, 
net of mortgages. Since financial and real wealth in SHARE are measured at the 
household level, their comparison with the SSW requires the latter to be defined at the 
household level as well. We construct a household level measure of SSW that is defined 
as the sum over household members of individual SSW. We denote this measure of 
Household Social Security Wealth by HSSW. Note that in doing so we avoid double 
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counting as our definition of SSW does not include survivors’ benefits and spousal 
benefits. We can think of our estimate of HSSW as a lower bound for the effective social 
security wealth available to the households. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
Table 7 reports the quintiles of the sample distribution of the household level measures of 
SSW, real assets and financial assets. Amounts are expressed in thousands of 2010 euros 
for all countries and PPP-adjusted to account for country level differences in the cost of 
living17. In order to assess whether HSSW is negatively associated with lower levels of 
financial and real wealth, we introduce the concept of total household wealth as the sum 
of HSSW, financial wealth and real wealth measures. This definition allows us to 
compute the shares of private wealth and social security wealth.  
FIGURE 8 HERE 
FIGURE 9 HERE 
In Figure 8 and Figure 9 we plot the country-level averages of the share of total 
household wealth held in SSW against the corresponding share of total household wealth 
held in financial and real wealth respectively. 
FIGURE 10 HERE 
FIGURE 11 HERE 
                                                          
17
 To align with the age restriction previously used, we dropped singles older than 75 and couples where 
both couple members are older than 75. We also still drop observations reporting values of SSW lower than 
the first percentile and higher than the ninety-ninth percentile. 
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Figures 10 and 11 repeat the same analysis at regional level (NUTS-1) in order to account 
for geographic differences in wealth accumulation. This disaggregation reveals 
substantial differences in the within-country variation of the composition of total 
household wealth. As an example, Poland exhibits higher dispersion in the share of 
HSSW and limited dispersion in the share of financial wealth. France is characterized by 
a high within-country variability in the share of financial wealth, while Germany exhibits 
significant within-country variability for both the shares of HSSW and financial wealth. 
Although we cannot draw conclusions on the likely “substitutability” between the two 
forms of wealth, a clear negative gradient is estimated both within and between countries 
regardless of whether real wealth or financial wealth is used. When looking at the 
country-level evidence in Figures 8 and 9, it emerges that the total wealth of Danish and 
Swiss households is characterized by low shares of HSSW and high shares of private 
financial and real wealth. At the other extreme, total wealth of Austrian and Polish 
households relies more greatly on HSSW and less on private wealth holdings. It is 
interesting to note that Italian and Spanish households qualify as “house-rich” since more 
than 50% of private wealth is held in real assets (housing) while a residual part is 
invested in financial markets. According to our findings, a lower share of total wealth 
held in Household Social Security Wealth is on average associated with a higher share of 
wealth held in financial and real assets. As expected, this negative relationship appears to 
be stronger for financial wealth than for real wealth, as financial wealth is more 
“fungible”, so that it can be easily decumulated during retirement.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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In this paper we investigate the distribution of old-age resources for a large number of 
European countries by making use of the SHARE data. We present a novel estimate of 
Social Security Wealth (SSW), which is computed at the individual level on SHARE 
data, and argue that this is an effective summary indicator of the resources that 
individuals could have access to in their old age. Our SSW measure is very detailed as it 
is based on the pension rules in place in each country in different points in time, and 
embeds country and gender specific mortality patterns, taking a lifetime perspective. 
Building upon this new measure, we are able to look at traditional inequality indexes: 
some countries show low median values of SSW but also very little variability over the 
possible range of values taken by the SSW, such as Denmark and to some extent the 
Netherlands. At the other extreme we observe countries, such as Italy and Spain, where 
the dispersion of SSW is much higher. 
Cross-country and within-country differences in SSW inequality might depend on 
different architectures of the pension systems as well as on heterogeneity in individual 
characteristics, in particular the amount of earnings collected during the working career. 
In order to control for individual heterogeneity due to differences in lifetime earnings, we 
exploit the information from SHARE to compute individuals’ Average Life Time Income 
(ALTI). We compute a progressivity index along the lines of the OECD Reports (2009, 
2011 and 2013) that compares inequality levels in Social security wealth and Average 
Lifetime Income in order to measure the degree of redistribution in SSW generated by the 
pension systems. A refinement of this is to “anchor” our measure of SSW to the 
distribution of average lifetime income. More precisely, we introduce a Relative Social 
Security Wealth (RSSW), defined as the ratio of SSW over ALTI, in the attempt to shed 
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light on the redistributive features of pension systems controlling for average labour 
income over whole working career. In fact, ALTI is positively related to the average 
amount of yearly contributions paid to the social security administration and could enter 
directly and indirectly into the pension formula. The higher is the SSW of a worker 
relatively to her average lifetime income earned (and the contributions paid), the higher is 
the generosity of the pension system for this worker. 
We present the distribution of RSSW ratio over the quintiles of average lifetime income 
and show that in countries such as Denmark, The Netherlands and Spain individuals 
whose working history is characterized by low levels of ALTI are also characterized by 
high levels of the RSSW ratio. In these countries the pension system is progressive. In 
other countries, such as Germany, the current pension system appears to be more 
regressive. 
Finally, we provide descriptive evidence of a household-level analysis of the interrelation 
between social security and private wealth. We show that in those countries where the 
first pension pillar is relevant, the share of total household wealth allocated in social 
security wealth is much higher. Although we cannot draw firm causality conclusions on 
the displacement effect of SSW on private wealth, the clear negative correlation that we 
obtain suggests that households who feel more protected by the welfare state are expected 
to cumulate lower levels of private real and financial assets.      
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Table 1. Number of observations by country, gender and labor market status at the 
time of the interview (SHARE selected sample, workers vs. retirees) 
Country Retirees Workers 
Total Males Females Total Males Females 
SE 497 225 272 276 113 163 
DK 423 211 212 451 202 249 
DE 536 284 252 232 89 143 
NL 459 232 227 299 137 162 
BE 576 323 253 247 112 135 
FR 598 295 303 258 116 142 
CH 330 155 175 242 109 133 
AT 236 112 124 44 21 23 
ES 245 182 63 123 75 48 
IT 350 198 152 152 71 81 
CZ 298 112 186 154 72 82 
PL 576 259 317 125 64 61 
Total 5124 2588 2536 2603 1181 1422 
 
Table 2. Number of observations by cohort, gender and labor market status at the 
time of the interview (SHARE workers vs. retirees) 
 Retirees 
 Workers 
Cohort Males Females Cohort Males Females 
1935-1939 876 697 1935-1947 106 83 
1940-1944 1,032 960 1948-1950 260 228 
1945-1949 578 640 1951-1953 411 433 
1950-1956 102 239 1954-1956 371 527 
/ / / 1957-1960 33 151 
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Table 3. Percentage of individuals receiving an old age first pillar pension who also 
receive an occupational pension benefit 
Country Occupational pensions Men Women 
 retirees workers retirees workers 
Austria 15.79% 0.00% 6.40% 5.56% 
Germany 33.51% 1.23% 16.93% 0.00% 
Sweden 73.42% 3.23% 74.33% 2.92% 
Netherlands 84.84% 7.52% 38.69% 5.96% 
Spain 3.44% 0.00% 2.30% 0.00% 
Italy 3.23% 0.00% 1.05% 0.00% 
France 3.31% 0.00% 1.05% 2.00% 
Denmark 41.52% 3.85% 33.86% 1.40% 
Switzerland 69.83% 5.77% 32.50% 3.13% 
Belgium 4.57% 2.00% 3.27% 1.59% 
Czech Republic 0.65% 0.00% 0.44% 0.00% 
Poland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Source: our computations on SHARE data; note: category 6 "Occupational survivor pension from 
your spouse or partner's job" has been excluded. 
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Table 4. Gini coefficients of SSW and of Average Lifetime Income (ALTI) and the progressivity index by country 
  Gini Index for_SSW   Gini Index for_ALTI   Progressivity Index 
  Workers Retirees   Workers Retirees   Workers Retirees 
  Men Women Men Women   Men Women Men Women   Men Women Men Women 
SE 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.29   0.30 0.31 0.42 0.41   0.00 -3.23 54.76 29.27 
DK 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.18   0.23 0.27 0.33 0.39   78.26 81.48 36.36 53.85 
DE 0.41 0.48 0.26 0.34   0.26 0.28 0.28 0.29   -57.69 -71.43 7.14 -17.24 
NL 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.12   0.24 0.32 0.37 0.41   66.67 71.88 48.65 70.73 
BE 0.16 0.19 0.60 0.59   0.28 0.25 0.36 0.33   42.86 24.00 -66.67 -78.79 
FR 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.36   0.31 0.30 0.73 0.78   38.71 53.33 63.01 53.85 
CH 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.25   0.22 0.28 0.27 0.31   77.27 85.71 22.22 19.35 
AT 0.18 0.22 0.31 0.39   0.23 0.37 0.42 0.42   21.74 40.54 26.19 7.14 
ES 0.26 0.20 0.27 0.28   0.38 0.42 0.66 0.65   31.58 52.38 59.09 56.92 
IT 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.35   0.29 0.31 0.52 0.58   17.24 32.26 50.00 39.66 
CZ 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.20   0.25 0.31 0.29 0.24   44.00 51.61 24.14 16.67 
PL 0.20 0.11 0.25 0.24   0.84 0.49 0.92 0.92   76.19 77.55 72.83 73.91 
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Table 5. Fitted median and percentage variations from the first quintile (in parentheses) of the RSSW index by country of 
residence, quintile of ALTI, and gender – workers 
 
 WORKERS – MEN  WORKERS – WOMEN 
Country Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
SE 9 7 7 7 7 12 7 7 7 8 
  (-22%) (-22%) (-22%) (-22%)   (-42%) (-42%) (-42%) (-33%) 
DK 3 3 2 2 1 6 4 3 2 2 
  (0%) (-33%) (-33%) (-67%)   (-33%) (-50%) (-67%) (-67%) 
DE 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 
  (33%) (33%) (33%) (33%)   (0%) (0%) (0%) (33%) 
NL 8 5 4 3 2 16 10 8 6 4 
  (-38%) (-50%) (-63%) (-75%)   (-38%) (-50%) (-63%) (-75%) 
BE 6 5 5 5 4 9 5 5 5 4 
  (-17%) (-17%) (-17%) (-33%)   (-44%) (-44%) (-44%) (-56%) 
FR 8 6 6 4 4 13 8 7 6 5 
  (-25%) (-25%) (-50%) (-50%)   (-38%) (-46%) (-54%) (-62%) 
CH 4 2 2 2 1 9 5 4 3 2 
  (-50%) (-50%) (-50%) (-75%)   (-44%) (-56%) (-67%) (-78%) 
AT 8 9 7 7 7 23 15 11 10 5 
  (13%) (-13%) (-13%) (-13%)   (-35%) (-52%) (-57%) (-78%) 
ES 18 9 6 7 7 21 11 11 8 6 
  (-50%) (-67%) (-61%) (-61%)   (-48%) (-48%) (-62%) (-71%) 
IT 11 7 8 6 6 23 12 11 10 9 
  (-36%) (-27%) (-45%) (-45%)   (-48%) (-52%) (-57%) (-61%) 
CZ 10 8 7 6 4 18 15 11 9 7 
  (-20%) (-30%) (-40%) (-60%)   (-17%) (-39%) (-50%) (-61%) 
PL 9 6 5 4 2 29 12 9 7 5 
  (-33%) (-44%) (-56%) (-78%)   (-59%) (-69%) (-76%) (-83%) 
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Table 6. Fitted median and percentage variations from the first quintile (in parentheses) of the RSSW index by country of 
residence, quintile of ALTI and gender – retirees 
 RETIREES – MEN  RETIREES – WOMEN 
Country Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
SE 14 6 4 3 2 15 8 6 5 3 
 
  -57% -71% -79% -86%    -47% -60% -67% -80% 
DK 6 3 2 1 1 14 7 5 3 2 
 
  -50% -67% -83% -83%    -50% -64% -79% -86% 
DE 13 7 6 5 4 9 8 6 6 4 
 
  -46% -54% -62% -69%    -11% -33% -33% -56% 
NL 15 6 4 3 2 30 16 11 8 4 
 
  -60% -73% -80% -87%    -47% -63% -73% -87% 
BE 18 12 8 6 4 19 13 13 10 5 
 
  -33% -56% -67% -78%    -32% -32% -47% -74% 
FR 22 11 7 5 2 31 12 10 7 2 
 
  -50% -68% -77% -91%    -61% -68% -77% -94% 
CH 5 4 3 2 2 11 7 5 4 3 
 
  -20% -40% -60% -60%    -36% -55% -64% -73% 
AT 39 18 13 8 5 32 15 14 10 6 
 
  -54% -67% -79% -87%    -53% -56% -69% -81% 
ES 93 22 11 6 3 77 34 19 7 3 
 
  -76% -88% -94% -97%    -56% -75% -91% -96% 
IT 28 12 11 6 4 79 14 13 6 3 
 
  -57% -61% -79% -86%    -82% -84% -92% -96% 
CZ 12 10 7 5 3 18 14 11 9 6 
 
  -17% -42% -58% -75%    -22% -39% -50% -67% 
PL 29 15 11 9 4 39 22 16 13 5 
 
  -48% -62% -69% -86%    -44% -59% -67% -87% 
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Table 7. Quintiles of the household distributions of SSW, real assets and financial assets 
 
Note: Amounts are PPP-adjusted and expressed in thousands of 2010 euros. 
 
  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
SE 106.7 149.7 210.5 269.0 368.0 0.0 64.4 123.4 220.4 528.9 1.8 19.0 43.1 92.1 197.4
DK 59.1 74.7 112.3 126.9 153.8 0.0 61.6 118.1 193.6 395.9 0.2 12.3 35.3 79.8 200.8
DE 36.0 117.3 182.1 242.4 354.1 0.0 36.2 108.6 199.2 380.2 0.0 5.4 18.1 42.1 135.8
NL 92.7 116.7 152.8 179.3 207.0 0.0 64.0 148.3 228.5 420.4 0.5 8.0 22.8 48.8 141.9
BE 103.2 167.8 220.1 324.8 1445.1 0.0 151.5 216.4 288.2 519.3 1.1 16.4 44.0 110.3 292.9
FR 101.5 145.5 203.2 285.2 469.4 0.0 144.0 225.0 319.7 540.0 0.0 7.2 24.8 62.1 168.5
CH 106.7 135.7 204.0 249.8 342.9 0.0 48.4 134.1 291.5 699.5 0.4 23.3 70.0 155.1 378.4
AT 108.5 173.8 219.8 292.6 447.7 0.0 35.3 84.0 172.8 315.4 0.0 2.4 9.0 22.9 60.0
ES 83.3 114.6 153.0 203.2 304.1 40.1 101.9 153.2 245.1 519.1 0.0 0.2 4.6 10.2 53.7
IT 74.9 114.8 170.2 226.9 364.9 0.0 119.2 177.0 309.8 531.0 0.0 2.7 11.5 26.6 71.2
CZ 75.7 116.1 150.0 198.2 262.4 0.0 54.0 101.3 155.4 270.2 0.0 2.0 6.3 14.3 36.1
PL 44.3 69.4 98.1 140.1 191.5 0.0 21.8 43.6 72.7 143.2 3.6 . 3.8 5.4 10.9
Household SSW Household real assets Household financial assets
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Figure 1. Distributions of social security wealth, by employment status and gender 
 
Note: “kdensity” = Kernel density. 
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Figure 2a. Box plot of SSW – Male workers 
 
 
Figure 2b. Box plot of SSW – Female workers 
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Figure 2c. Box plot of SSW – Male retirees 
 
 
Figure 2d. Box plot of SSW – Female retirees 
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Figure 3. Distributions of Average LifeTime Income (ALTI), by employment status 
and gender 
 
Note: “kdensity” = Kernel density. 
 
Figure 4. Fitted median and 95% confidence interval of the RSSW index for 
workers by quintile of ALTI and gender: Germany 
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Figure 5. Fitted median and 95% confidence interval of the RSSW index for 
workers by quintile of ALTI and gender: Spain (upper panel) and Italy (lower 
panel) 
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Figure 6. Fitted median and 95% confidence interval of the RSSW index for 
workers by quintile of ALTI and gender: Denmark (upper panel) and The 
Netherlands (lower panel) 
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Figure 7. Fitted median and 95% confidence interval of the RSSW index by quintile 
of ALTI and gender for Germany: retirees 
 
 
Figure 8. Share of social security wealth versus share of financial wealth, by country 
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Figure 9.  Share of social security wealth versus share of net real wealth, by country 
 
 
Figure 10.  Share of social security wealth versus share of financial wealth 
 European macro regions (NUTS1) 
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Figure 11.  Share of social security wealth versus share of net real wealth 
European macro regions (NUTS1) 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A.1. Gini coefficients of SSW and of Lifetime Income (LTI) and the 
progressivity index, by country 
 
Gini_SSW Gini_LTI Progressivity Index 
Workers Retirees   Workers Retirees   Workers Retirees 
Men Women Men Women   Men Women Men Women   Men Women Men Women 
SE 0.30 0.32 0.19 0.29   0.46 0.52 0.51 0.57   34.78 38.46 62.75 49.12 
DK 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.18   0.45 0.56 0.47 0.6   88.89 91.07 55.32 70.00 
DE 0.41 0.48 0.26 0.34   0.33 0.38 0.33 0.42   -24.24 -26.32 21.21 19.05 
NL 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.12   0.35 0.54 0.42 0.63   77.14 83.33 54.76 80.95 
BE 0.16 0.19 0.6 0.59   0.37 0.43 0.42 0.44   56.76 55.81 -42.86 -34.09 
FR 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.36   0.42 0.51 0.79 0.82   54.76 72.55 65.82 56.10 
CH 0.05 0.04 0.21 0.25   0.3 0.45 0.28 0.47   83.33 91.11 25.00 46.81 
AT 0.18 0.22 0.31 0.39   0.35 0.43 0.47 0.51   48.57 48.84 34.04 23.53 
ES 0.26 0.2 0.27 0.28   0.53 0.58 0.7 0.68   50.94 65.52 61.43 58.82 
IT 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.35   0.37 0.4 0.61 0.71   35.14 47.50 57.38 50.70 
CZ 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.2   0.63 0.57 0.5 0.37   77.78 73.68 56.00 45.95 
PL 0.20 0.11 0.25 0.24   0.86 0.54 0.94 0.95   76.74 79.63 73.40 74.74 
 
Figure A.1. Distributions of LifeTime Income (LTI), by employment status and 
gender 
 
Note: “kdensity” = Kernel density. 
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